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Abstract: In the Environmental Protection Agency's proposed mitigation measures (published 
1/17/07, Federal Register), we can see the precautionary principle in action: "When an activity 
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be 
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically" 
(Ashford 1998). EPA's proposed measures would classify all second-generation anticoagulant 
rodenticides as "restricted use ," so that they cannot be sold to the general public. This proposed 
restriction will diminish the ability of consumers to control rodents in their own residence, and 
will disproportionately affect minority and low-income citizens in the large cities of America. 
EPA's analysis fails to properly account for the potential impact on public health and other social 
costs of their mitigation proposal. The EPA 's analysis does not show that second-generation 
anticoagulant rodenticides present a significant hazard to non-target wildlife. At best , it simply 
makes a case that primary and secondary hazards are possible. It does not allow any conclusions 
about the actual risk posed to wildlife. Liphatech (and other manufacturers , through the 
Rodenticide Registrants ' Task Force , RRTF) have proposed alternative mitigation measure s to 
address both risks to wildlife and risks to children, while preserving the public's access to the 
most effective rodent control pesticides. The proposed alternatives include : limiting consumer 
rodenticide use to inside of buildings , using bittering agents in consumer products , directing 
consumers to use smaller bait placements , using label language that is more clear and 
understandable to the consumer , providing consumer education through internet sites and point-
of-sale signs /brochures 
Key words: bait station, human safety, precautionary principle , risk mitigation , rodent control, 
rodent damage, rodenticide , rodenticide restriction, secondary hazard 
INTRODUCTION 
Liphatech Inc ., is a manufacturer of 
rodenticide products , utilizing three active 
ingredients that were discovered and 
commercialized by a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer based in Lyon , France. We are 
also a member of the Rodenticide 
Registrants' Task Force (RRTF), and have 
been closely following the reregistration and 
ecological risk assessment processes for 
rodenticides. The views expressed in this 
paper represent only Liphatech. RRTF 
members have achieved consensus on many 
Proceeding s of the 12'11 Wildlife Damage 
Management Conference (D.L. Nolte, W .M. 
Arjo , D.H. Stalman, Eds). 2007 
issues , but my remarks may not reflect the 
opinions or positions of all rodenticide 
manufacturers or RR TF members. 
While others have addressed risks to 
wildlife, I would like to focus on the most 
important non-target species in this country 
that should most concerns us: human beings! 
Liphatech would like to speak out on behalf 
of the "retail consumers " in America. The 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) estimates that homeowners spend 
more than $90 million per year on rodent 
control , with 90% of that amount spent on 
bait. lt is critical that our discussions about 
the non-target hazards of rodenticide take 
account for the risk to people : "So me 
rodents can be injurious to humans and their 
belongings. Both introduced and native 
species may be carriers or reservoirs for 
infectious diseases . Rodents may cause 
economic damage to crops; consume and 
contaminate stored food supplies; disturb 
soil through burrowing activities; damage 
houses, other types of buildings and man-
made structures; and prey on native species, 
including birds that nest on oceanic islands . 
It is generally estimated that commensal rats 
cause between $0.5 and $1.0 billion of 
economic losses in the United States 
annually" (Edwards 2007). 
Under the mitigation measures 
proposed by EPA on January 17, 2007, 
homeowners would no longer have access to 
baits contammg second generation 
anticoagulant roderiticides (SGARs). The 
proposal also includes a requirement that all 
rodenticide for sale to a consumer must be 
sold in a tamper-resistant bait statio n, with 
solid bait blocks as the only permissible bait , 
in order to reduce the number of children 
exposed to these product s. 
The EPA's analysis "Po tential Risks 
of Nine Rodenticides to Birds and Non-
target Mammals: a Comparative Approach" 
(Erickson and Urban 2004) does not show 
that second-ge neration anticoagu I ant 
rodenticides present a significant hazard to 
non-target wildlife. This comparative risk 
assessment does not fully assess "ris k" 
because it does not assess the ·'exposure" 
component of the risk equation (i.e., risk = 
toxicity X exposure) as is necessary if one is 
to fully assess risk. The assessment and 
"peer review" were not conducted in 
accordance with EPA's own guidelines. The 
document clearly states that the analysis is 
severely limited , discussing the uncertainties 
at length , and showing an extensive list of 
the "data needs " necessary for the analysis 
to be made meaningful. There has been no 
data call-in to gather the necessary 
information. There were many public 
comments concerning the poor science and 
other major deficiencies of this risk 
assessment, and we note that EPA has failed 
to respond to most of these criticisms. At 
best, this analysis simply makes a case that 
primary and secondary hazards are possible. 
Yet, we see EPA acting as if there were no 
questions or uncertainty surrounding this 
analysis: "EPA's comparative ecological 
risk assessment concludes that all nine 
rodenticide active ingredients pose 
significant risks to non-target wildlife when 
applied as grain-based bait products." 
(Edwards 2007) 
More important for this discussion, 
EPA's analysis does not include a 
meaningful assessment of public health 
impact and benefits of rodenticide use . How 
will the proposed restnct10ns affect 
consumers who are trying to control rodents 
in their homes? What do the public health 
experts of the U.S. governme nt have to say 
about this proposal? There is nothing 
substa ntial in the docket from the Centers 
for Disease Control, Department of 
Agriculture, or Housing and Urban 
Development , despite the sta tement that 
EPA will "co ntinue its ongoing 
consultations ... " with these agencies. Where 
can we find the needed analy sis of the 
soc ietal benefits of rodenticide use? 
Perhaps we can find our answers in 
the Agency's " [mpact Assessment for 
Proposed Rodenticide Mitigation" (Edwards 
2007). This document emphasizes risks to 
children from exposure to rodenticide, 
showing that there were more than l 7,000 
reported "rodenticide exposure incidents" 
per year (3-year average for 2003-2005), 
and the reported cases may only account for 
a quarter of all actual exposures. Where the 
outcome of the reported exposure is known, 
93% are reported as "no effect," although 
some costs are incurred from health facility 
visits and: "In addition, there are likely to 
be costs associated with lost productivity for 
the time and anxiety associated with a call to 
a poison control center" (Chiri et al. 2006). 
The impact assessment mentions various 
figures about rat-bite incidents , including a 
1969 estimate of 14,000 bite incidents per 
year to the 140 million city dwellers in the 
U.S . Notably, the document fails to assign 
any cost, time lost or anxiety associated with 
this large number of rat bite incidents . 
The assessment also purports to 
make an estimation of some of the costs to 
users associated with the mitigations , 
including a "soc io-economic equity 
assessment." It discusses "severa l economic 
methods that can be used to place a value on 
ecosystem services." It mentions the 
potential for market distortions and the large 
uncertainty associated with estimating the 
costs of the proposed actions. 
In the end, however , this impact 
assessment was unable to "monetize" the 
potential costs, the health effects or 
environmental benefits associated with the 
proposed mitigation actions. There is no 
explanation of how the cost versus benefit is 
weighed. Instead , we are left with only the 
general conclusions that the proposed 
mitigation should not have an adverse 
impact on residential users in terms of 
significantly increased costs or decreased 
effectiveness. These conclusions are 
founded on some dubious assumptions, 
including these: "One snap ( or glue) trap is 
assumed to be , roughly , the equivalent of 
one bait station with bait blocks " (Chiri et 
al. 2006). "Low income consumers living in 
apartment buildings most likely rely on the 
building owner or manager for rodent 
contro l inside the apartment or building" 
(Chiri et al. 2006). "EPA assumes that 
consumers' selection of rodenticide baits is 
primarily driven by trade nam es and not by 
the active ingredi ents contained in the baits" 
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(Chiri et al. 2006). "EPA further believes 
that replacement of second-generation 
anticoagulants with first generation 
anticoagulants will not significantly affect 
the homeowners capability to control 
rodents ... " (Edwards 2007). Are we sure 
about this? On this very same page , EPA 
states that second-generation rodenticides 
are superior in controlling rodent 
populations: "For those residential settings 
where second-generation anticoagulants 
provide a distinct advantage, these products 
would still be available from certified 
applicators" (Edwards 2007). EPA clearly 
recognizes that the older , first generation 
rodenticides will likely not be as effective: 
"Multiple dose (first generation) 
anticoagulant baits are especially vulnerable 
to situations where the availability of 
alternative food sources make it less likely 
that a rodent will return to feed on baits for 
several days in succession until it ingests a 
lethal dose" (Chiri et al. 2006). 
Certainly , the older, first-generation 
rodcnticides can be made to pass EPA' s 
laboratory efficacy tests , but are they equal 
to the SGARs in controlling rodent 
populations? Trade name ( or brand) 
awareness and loyalty are a result of the 
product 's perceived value to the consumer. 
lf the consumers do not get the expected 
value (if the product does not work as 
expected) then the trade name will not draw 
the consumers' interest. The brand names 
that are recognized and attractive to 
consumers have established a history and 
reputation for their effectiveness . If the 
popular brand does not work very we ll, it 
will not be popular very long! Consumers 
are, in fact, selecting the active ingredient. 
When they select products with a history 
and reputation for good performance , they 
select the active ingredient that provides this 
performance. 
Should these important risk 
mitigation decisions be based on broad, 
untested assumptions? ls it prudent to 
examine how the proposal could affect 
humans and non-target wildlife if these 
critical assumptions do not hold true? Do we 
really believe that there will be no impact 
when the highly effective SGAR products 
are taken away from consumers? Let us 
consider: "S ince a wide range of rodent 
control options would continue to be 
available, no adverse impact on the 
frequency of rat bites is expected as a result 
of the proposed mitigation " (Chiri et al. 
2006) . The 1969 estimate of 14,000 bite 
incidents per year was based on an estimate 
of 140 million city dwellers . The 1970 U.S. 
population of 213 million has now grown to 
more than 300 million , an increase of more 
than 40%. The population of city dwellers 
may have increased by an even greater 
percentage, but let us assume that urban 
population growth has been the same as the 
general population. That gives us an 
estimate of about 197 mi Ilion urban dwellers 
today . Has the rate of rat bites remained at 
the same rate? If so, there would be almost 
20,000 rat bites per year in the U.S. How 
many of these rat-bite incidents would be 
considered "no effect," compared to 
rodenticide "expos ure incidents" where 93% 
are classified as "no effect?" If the proposed 
restrictions do , in fact , make rodent control 
more difficult and less effective, will the 
number of rat bites increase? What is the 
soc ial and medical cost associated with bite 
incident s, compared to the rodenticide 
exposure incidents? Are the proposed 
restriction s truly "protecting children" from 
the real hazards posed by rodents? 
EPA ' s cost analysis shows the 
consumer ' s "cos t" could decrease by using 
traps rather than rodenticide. The cost is 
estimated to increase by 83% up to 976% if 
the consumer chooses to continue using bait , 
which must be pre-packaged in a bait station 
under the proposed requirements. Due to the 
very stringent requirements for a "tamper 
137 
resistant " bait station , actual costs are likely 
to be even higher. Cost to the consumer 
increases by at least 10,000 % if the services 
of a professional pest control operator are 
necessary. What would be the real cost of 
the proposed restrictions? 
Perhaps we can consider the 
alternatives more carefully for the answers. 
Snap traps and glue traps have always been 
the lowest-cost control method , but 
consumers have still chosen to spend 90% of 
their money on bait products. This suggests 
that consumers have determined that baits 
are more effective in controlling rodent 
infestations, in spite of EPA' s assumptions 
to the contrary. If consumers continue to 
choose rodenticide baits as the most 
effective control method available to them , 
then the EPA ' s analysis shows that their 
costs will rise dramatically. Using EPA's 
own numbers , the $90 million currently 
spent on baits could rise to $175 million 
(95% increase) or even up to $878 million 
(976%). At what point will increased costs 
become significa nt? How docs EPA make a 
cost /benefit analysis to support the sta ted 
conclusion: "E PA has concluded that the 
expected reduction in children ' s exposure to 
rodenticide bait products outweighs the 
estimated cost mcrea se due to the 
requirement for tamper-resistant bait 
stations" (Edwards 2007). 
How have we arrived at such a 
situation , where such important public 
health decisions are based on such flimsy 
analyses? It appears that we see the 
precautionary principle in action: "When an 
activity raises threats of harm to human 
health or the environment, precautionary 
measures should be taken even if some 
cause and effect relationships are not fully 
established scientifically" (Ashford 1998). 
Is there a better way to address the 
concerns that have been identified? Since 
the first stakeho lder meetings were held in 
1999 and 2000, the RR TF has promoted 
sensible m1t1gation measures that could be 
implemented quickly and with little cost to 
the consumer. These mitigation would offer 
increased protection to wildlife and children, 
while still allowing the public's access to the 
most effective rodent baits available : using 
label language that 1s more clear, 
understandable and informative to the 
consumer; providing consumer education 
through internet sites and point-of-sale 
signs /brochures ; directing consumers to use 
smaller bait placements ; limiting consumer 
rodenticide application to inside of 
buildings; and inclusion of bittering agents 
in consumer products. 
Several times , the RR TF group has 
attempted to prod EPA into adopting the 
label improvement measure s, but each time 
EPA failed to move forward. EPA has 
generally considered product label 
improvements to be the first tool for 
promoting product stewardship . ln the past 
20 years , EPA has developed many label 
improvement programs , including a large 
effort called the "Consumer Labeling 
Initiative ." Thus , it is particularly surprising 
that EPA has not initiated label 
improvements for rodenticides before taking 
more drastic actions: "Independent of the 
mitigation measures discussed above , EPA 
is cu1Tently considering specific labeling 
improvements to make rodenticide labels 
clearer and more understandable . ln 
particular , the Agency is focused on labeling 
changes that would provide clearer direction 
to consumers on how to use rodenticide 
products in order to minimize potential 
exposure to children , wildlife , and pets. The 
Agency has concluded , however , that 
labeling enhancements alone would not 
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mitigate the risks to children and wildlife to 
a sufficient degree ." (Edwards 2007) 
How has EPA reached this important 
conclusion about the insufficiency of label 
improvements? What specific improvements 
could be made , and how would their effect 
be measured? The product is the best means 
of communicating important information to 
the user of a pesticide product. Why would 
label improvements be delayed , rather than 
used as the first stewardship effort? 
All of the reasonable mitigation 
proposed by RRTF can help to reduce the 
exposure of children and non-target wildlife 
to rodenticides . These low-cost measures 
should be implemented and properly 
evaluated before EPA denies consumer 
acces s to these effective rodent control 
products . 
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